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Indigenous Authority and State Policy:*
Popular participation in two villages in rural Bolivia 
 
Vibeke Andersson**
 
In recent years Bolivia has been going through substantial economic and social 
transformations. Due to changes in the world economy, the tin prices, which 
Bolivia relied on as main income, have fallen significantly. This has led to a 
situation, where the World Bank and the IMF entered and in cooperation with 
the Bolivian government passed a structural adjustment program in 1985. The 
economic situation improved as an effect of the program but the social situation 
got worse. The poverty of the majority of the Bolivian population has increased 
in this period. 
 
This situation is part of the background for the new political and administrative 
reforms by the Bolivian State. This article discusses one of these new reforms, 
namely the reform of Participación Popular, the popular participation reform, 
which is analyzed on the basis of the author’s fieldwork in a municipality in the 
southern part of the Potosí department, Bolivia.  
 
Introduction 
The material for this working paper was gathered during my fieldwork in a 
municipality located in the Potosí Department in the southern part of Bolivia. 
The emphasis in presenting the findings here lies in letting some of the people of 
the villages in the municipality speak. Therefore quotations are used as 
explaining views of the village people on the reforms, which the Bolivian State 
has been implementing in rural areas since 1995. The fieldwork took place in 
1999 and 2000. Special emphasis will be put on the reform of “Participación 
Popular” (popular participation), which is a municipal reform, which 
decentralizes funds and decisions to the municipal councils. This 
decentralization is a profound transformation in Bolivian society, which until 
1995 was very centralised when it comes to power and spending of funds. The 
people living in the rural areas of Bolivia have not been used to anything good 
coming from the central government. Either the rural areas have been neglected, 
or new laws have been passed, that in some form reduced the land available for 
the rural population. The popular participation reform has for the first time 
introduced possibilities for change in the rural areas supported by the State and 
supposedly intended to take the rural population’s demands into consideration. 
Popular participation is a tool to introducing methods of “good governance” on 
the local level. Good governance has been important to introduce to third world 
                                                          
* This paper is based on two year field research in Bolivia. 
** Vibeke Andersson is Research Fellow at Research Center on Development and International Relations, 
Aalborg University, Denmark. 
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countries within recent years. This has to be seen in relation to the 
democratization processes, which is introduced in many countries by foreign 
donors and governments in cooperation (Leftwitch 1993). In these 
democratization processes it is an inherent assumption, that democracy is 
“good” and can be applied everywhere, regardless of culture, traditions and 
history in third world countries around the world. The implementation of 
democratization is incorporating elements appropriate to the specific countries. 
In Bolivia, the indigenous population requires special themes to be dealt with, 
since their traditions are important for social organization in the rural areas, and 
since the indigenous population is a majority in the country. 
 
The Bolivian mine export sector has for a long period of time been able to 
support the oligarchal state, leaving other areas and parts of the population 
outside the core of the state. This has changed with declining exports and 
collapse of the state’s economy. Foreign donors and national governments have 
sowed the need for change within the Bolivian state. And they have seen the 
need for incorporating rural areas and their population into the state, to thereby 
create economic and social growth for the country. This implies making the 
rural indigenous population “interested” in supporting the state. To create this 
interest, the State has had to give something in return. In this case possibility of 
political influence at the municipal level and decentralization of State funds to 
the municipalities. This paper tries to show the interest “from below” towards 
the popular participation reform and the inherent acknowledging of a 
marginalized group of people: The indigenous people of Bolivia’s rural areas. 
 
State and Parties 
In Bolivia, as in many other third world countries, political parties have played a 
crucial role in power structures of the state. In this context political parties are 
renowned for their paternalistic structure with wide spread use of patron-client 
relations at all levels of society. 
 
In 1952 Bolivia experienced a revolution. The revolution was led by MNR 
(Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario - the national revolutionary movement) 
which later transformed into a party. This party has been governing the country 
for various periods since 1952. One of the primary goals of the MNR after 
gaining power in 1952 was to nationalize the major mines and industries of 
Bolivia. Until then the Bolivian society was characterized by ultraliberal rule 
with the Criollo1 minority as the ruling class possessing all assets of society. 
The government and legislation favored the Criollo population and the rural 
areas were “forgotten” unless people living there were needed as working force 
on the haciendas or in the mines. In the hacienda-areas the “pongo” (rural 
laborer) by the ruling classes was regarded as little less than a slave of the 
hacienda-owner. 
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The MNR started as a revolutionary movement in the 1940's consisting of city 
intellectuals and peasant leaders of the Cochabamba valleys. When in power 
after the revolution the MNR - apart from the nationalization of the mines - 
passed an agrarian reform, that made the former pongos owners of a small plot 
of land. Some of the former hacienda-areas (but not all, (Anteza 1992)) 
transformed into plots of freehold farms. 
 
The nationalization of the mines converted the state into the owner of the major 
sources of income of the country. One of the primary effects was that the 
political parties became a source of wealth for the people connected to the 
parties. This way of doing politics is rooted in the political system, which the 
new republics of Latin America ”inherited” from the Spaniards during more 
than 300 years of colonization. The new republics maintained an administration 
apparatus that was built by the colonial state. In the colonial state the 
administration represented a source of wealth in the sense that the state was 
“owned” by the ruling class of people drawn overwhelmingly from the most 
educated and articulate sections of the population, and associated in most cases 
with those groups within society which already enjoyed the greatest social 
status, wealth and power (Spaniards and Criollos) (Clapham 1985). This 
constitutes a form of governing, that could be described as “neo-
patrimonialism”, which signifies that officials hold positions in bureaucratic and 
political organizations with power which is formally defined, but exercise this 
power in a form of private property to state administration. This also constitutes 
a fair amount of corruption and clientilism inside the political system (Clapham 
1985; Christoffanini 1989). Originating from the patrimonial governance of the 
Spanish King, where political administration was a personal matter for the King, 
the democratic tradition in Latin America has developed differently than in 
Europe, where “the fathers of liberalism” (Montesquieu , Locke and Roussau) 
were concerned (theoretically) with securing the rights of the individual towards 
the state after years of absolutist royal rule in Europe. Latin American leaders, 
on the other hand, have been concerned with the state controlling the individuals 
(Christoffanini 1989). In Bolivia this can be seen in the many years of oligarchic 
rule  (1825-1952) and in the constitution of the  “state of 1952”2 (Laserna 1997), 
where the ruling political party formed the state and possessed all the nation’s 
assets. 
 
As a particular expression of this, the ruling political party in power in Bolivia 
has had an almost absolute monopoly to secure jobs and positions for its 
followers. The party “owned” the state and individuals connected to the ruling 
party were secured jobs and advantages for as long as the party was in 
government. This means that party politics in Bolivia is much more than 
politics: It’s a way of securing the wealth of members of political parties.  
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Participación Popular 
The reform: Participación Popular”, is seen by some as a “modernization” of the 
Bolivian State (PROADE/ILDIS 1994; Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano 1997). 
The main objective of the reform is to break down former systems 
patrimonialism and speed up the decentralization and democratization of the 
Bolivian society.  The reform Participación Popular is by Bolivian academics 
and foreign donors regarded as a big leap forward in changing the Bolivian 
society at all levels (political. economical, cultural), and the donors are 
following the process closely. 
 
Participación Popular is a law on municipalities. It divides rural areas into new 
municipalities with elected municipal councils and it redirects tax money from 
the central administration to the new municipalities. Every municipality receives 
funds that match the number of inhabitants of the municipality. But apart from 
this more ”technical” decentralization of funds and political influence, the 
Participación Popular also recognizes that the rural areas have had their own 
way of organizing in the villages (“comunidades”), which often originates from 
the Prehispanic period.  
 
When the Spaniards arrived to what today is Bolivia, the population in the 
Andean region was a part of the Inca empire. When conquering new areas, the 
Incas installed their own administration, but generally did not interfere with the 
population’s organization of daily life or way of organizing production. In what 
is now the Bolivian highland region (and in the highland regions of other 
Andean countries) the population was organized in ayllus, which were kinship 
groups linked together by real or inhibited kinship and with collectively owned 
land in different ecological zones. This secured different products inside each 
ayllu, which this way became self-sufficient. The ayllu’s social organization was 
based on ”cargo’s” (duties) which were rotating, and normally a person 
possessed a cargo for a year, beginning with the most insignificant (today: 
comisario, meaning common member) and ending with the cargo of the 
“kuraka” (or jilaqu); the traditional leader of the ayllu3. It was regarded as a duty 
of the male members of the ayllu to fulfill the different cargo’s. 
 
When the Spaniards came to the area, many ayllus were split up and the people 
were relocated in villages, located near the haciendas to secure the hacienda 
owners a labor force4. In spite of the breaking up of the ayllus, the way of 
organizing leadership has persisted - also in the new villages created by the 
Spaniards (Albó 1990). 
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The authorities of the rural villages were thus the kurakas and another “new” 
authority, the corregidor. The corregidor was an administrative post in rural 
areas installed by the Spaniards5, and until 1952 he was collecting taxes.6  
 
In the 1960's the labor union started organizing the rural areas, and during the 
Banzer and Garcia Meza dictatorships in the 70's and beginning of the 80's, the 
peasant labor union, was a major political force in the rural areas. In most 
villages people formed unions linked to the national peasant union, CSUTCB 
(Central Sindical de los Trabajadores Campesinos Bolivianos - Association of 
peasants in Bolivia). 
 
The way of organizing the rural communities, have been built into the reform of 
Participación Popular. Local organizations – unions or original organizations as 
ayllus can register as OTB’s (Organización Teritorial de Base - territorial basis 
organizations). The OTB represents the people of a territory. This can be the 
territory of an ayllu or the territory in which the members of a union live. The 
members of the OTB elect one member to the Comité de Vigilancia (supervising 
committee), whose duty it is to participate in municipal planning and to control 
the budget of the municipality. In this way, the Participación Popular aims at 
making original organizations in the rural area part of the law. Not by 
incorporating them, but by acknowledging them. This is a profound change of 
state politics, since the rural areas have been marginalised in the Bolivian State 
until recently. The problem in forming the OTB’s has until now been, that 
information about the law has not reached the rural areas in an organized matter. 
Therefore much doubt has existed in the municipalities as to how the OTB’s 
were supposed to function.  
 
State Politics towards the Rural Indigenous Population 
In the first half of the 20th century the ruling Criollo class regarded the 
indigenous population of Bolivia as backward and as an obstacle against 
evolution/modernity (Demant 1986; Mörner 1987; Poole 1997). The culture and 
way of life of the indigenous population was regarded as impossible to integrate 
into “modern” life. As a consequence of this, the indigenous population was 
marginalised, oppressed and exploited in the Bolivian (urban, mine, and 
hacienda) society. 
 
The revolution of 1952 was supported by the peasants - mostly from the 
Cochabamba area. After gaining power, the MNR passed several reforms that 
changed the Bolivian society profoundly: The right of voting for everyone, an 
educational reform, the nationalization of mines and major industries and an 
agrarian reform where haciendas were split up and former pongos received land.  
The derogatory word “indio” which categorized the Bolivian indigenous 
population before 1952 was by MNR changed to “campesino” to indicate, that 
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the Bolivian society was changing towards an (attempted) mono cultural society. 
This was seen in opposition to a society characterized by diversified cultures 
divided in (urban) criollo and mestizo cultures and (rural) indigenous cultures. 
The political project of the MNR in the post revolutional period was the creation 
of a Bolivian “nation”7. 
 
The creation of the Bolivian nation8 failed for different reasons in the years 
following the revolution. One of the main factors was the fact that the Bolivian 
State did not “need” the rural population as citizens and taxpayers, since the 
state was secured income from the nationalized mines and industries. The rural 
(indigenous) population was marginalised after the agrarian reform. No laws 
were passed which could have helped improve production and infrastructure in 
the Bolivian rural areas (Antezana 1992)9. 
 
The economic situation of Bolivia changed during the 1980's. By 1985 Bolivia 
was on the edge of bankruptcy due to falling tin prices (until then Bolivias main 
source of income), and new political initiatives were needed, if the state was not 
to collapse. The political elite recognized this and from 1985 and on, work was 
being prepared for the reform of Participación Popular, which was passed in 
parliament in 1994, when MNR was the governing political party. 
 
The formal recognition of the indigenous population and culture in Bolivian law 
and society is new. One factor, which led the Bolivian government to initiate 
this, has been an existence of a discourse at the international level about 
securing human rights - in this context the rights of the indigenous population.  
 
Internationally many discussions have taken place regarding the indigenous 
populations, their rights and their way of life. 
 
The modernization discourse was for many years centered on the dichotomy 
“primitive” versus “modern”. The assumption was, that by way of an 
evolutionary process of development, the so called primitive societies with their 
own specific cultures would eventually become modern, in the western sense of 
the word (Kearney 1997). Many studies have showed, however, that this 
evolutionary assumption of development was mistaken.  Instead of “becoming 
modern”, indigenous people of the third world co-opted some of the western 
ideas and transformed these in their own worldview. Or new forms erupted, as a 
“hybrid” in the interface between “modern” and “traditional” (Escobar 1995). 
Others describe the situation as a merging of traditionally rooted and western 
patterns of life, i.e. that rural communities have developed their own way of 
coping with “modernity” (Ströbele-Gregor 1996). 
 
Indigenous Organizing Practices 
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In Bolivia, the life and organizing practices of indigenous population has, as 
mentioned before, been regarded as backward and not part of a “modern” 
society by the Criollo population. But, on the other hand, one could choose to 
see the persistent ”traditional” patterns of life among the indigenous population 
as a reconstruction of traditions and culture - and thus as a way of adapting to 
new socio-economic surroundings. For example: the existence of a kuraka in the 
comunidades of the rural areas of Potosí is not necessarily a “relict” of former 
social organization, but on contrary a sign of recontextualizing organizing 
practices and reinvention of traditions (Hobsbawm 1983). The role of the kuraka 
in the comunidades of today is very different from the role of the kuraka in the 
times of the Incas and the Spaniards. In the time of the Spanish Colony the 
kuraka was an official related to the Spanish administrators. His main task was 
to collect taxes and organize the mita, which was a praxis of sending the male 
population of the comunidad/ayllu to work in the mines for a period of six 
months, securing a certain amount of persons working in the mines at all times. 
Also the kuraka was one of the leaders of the community. This way the 
Spaniards transformed the content of the kuraka’s duties and installed a local 
administrator at the community level. To secure the kuraka’s loyalty towards the 
Spaniards, the cargo10 was to be inherited from father to son. 
 
Today the kuraka is still one of the leaders of the community in some parts of 
the Potosí department, together with the political authority, the corregidor, but 
both kuraka and corregidor are cargo’s, which are to be held for one year only 
by all male members of the community. Each year on the 6th of January, the new 
holders of the cargos are installed. 
 
Once a newly wed couple has received land from their parents, they can become 
“afiliados” (real members) of the village. This indicates that they are a 
household and therefore members and must fulfill their duties. If the man for 
some reason cannot fulfill his duty, the wife substitutes. 
 
“I have not yet been authority, but I was admitted membership three years ago. I 
have to start with the most inferior cargos, furthermore I am too young to be 
corregidor or kuraka. Last year I was on the school board, now I’m just 
common member” (Jacinto Ramos)  
 
The cargo of the corregidor is an example of the local communities’ ability to 
change the content of an office dictated by the authorities of the state. According 
to the law, the corregidor today is nominated as a political representative on 
local level of the ruling party (parties) in government. Ideally the corregidor 
should be a person connected to the party in the local community. In reality the 
situation is often different. The community can elect a person for the cargo, no 
matter his political affiliation11. The person is often elected because of personal 
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skills, experience and charisma. The corregidor has to sort out all kinds of 
problems inside the community, and represent the community on departmental 
level. 
 
The corregidor, kuraka and other authorities form an assembly of authorities 
every time important decisions are to be made in the community. The assembly 
rules using consensus for all decisions and in this way secures those decisions 
taken, oblige all members of the community. Ruling by way of consensus is an 
Andean tradition since before the Incas (Albó 1990). 
 
In 1995 the first municipal elections were held in Bolivia. All candidates had to 
be elected from a party list. This means that party politics no longer only is 
important on the national level. The parties have now extended their power to 
the municipal level as well. This might seem as a paradox, since part of the 
reason for passing the law of Participación Popular was to avoid the 
centralization, corruption and clientilism of the political parties. On the other 
hand, it was the political parties of the Parliament, which had to pass the law. 
And in parliament none was interested in losing power, for example to local 
interest groups. So the law included the political parties protagonists of local 
governance.  
 
The Municipality of Coma  
The municipality was formed as a result of the law of popular participation. 
Coma is situated in the central part of the Potosí department. The municipality is 
rural with a small urban center, the town of Coma, where the municipal offices 
are located. The municipality is inhabited by a little over 20.000 people. 
 
The topography of the municipality is divided into two “zones”. The eastern part 
is situated on a plateau in about 3700 m’s. above sea level. Part of this area was 
until 1952 divided between various haciendas, and the inhabitants of the villages 
of this area were in some way or the other obliged to work for the hacienda 
owner. 
 
The western part of the municipality is mountainous, and the agriculture is 
concentrated in the valleys, where only a small strip of land beside the rivers can 
be cultivated. This area consists of a number of ayllus. The town of Coma is 
situated in a small valley.  
 
Most families in the rural areas of the municipality are engaged in small-scale 
agriculture – often so small, that the family can not survive from agriculture 
alone. Therefore almost every family has one or more members who migrate to 
low land Bolivia or Argentina to work seasonally. 
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Forms of Organization in Ayllus and Ex-hacienda Areas 
In some parts of the municipality, the ex-hacienda areas border the ayllu areas. 
Two villages, which are physically close, but which on the other hand are 
different in organization, due to their historical background, were chosen as case 
studies. 
 
The two are the comunidad Huya, which belongs to an ayllu, and comunidad El 
Puente, which lies in an ex-hacienda area. 
 
Comunidad Huya 
The village Huya is situated in the ayllu Mankasaya. Generally the members of 
ayllus are very proud of their past, since their ancestors fought the “patrones” 
(hacienda owners) and prevented their entrance on ayllu lands. Members of 
ayllus value their past as “free” as opposed to the population of the ex-hacienda 
areas. 
 
“These lands are original lands, a few kilometers from here there were 
haciendas and the owners made the laborers suffer. But our grandfathers did 
not permit the hacienda-owners to enter this place. Our grandfathers confronted 
them and forbade them enter these lands. I am proud that our ancestors fought 
the hacienda-owners and made them flee.” (Braulio Chuca) 
 
The above citation shows a discursive reconstruction of a glorious past, which is 
opposed to the past of the people in the hacienda-areas, who were forced to 
work for the “patrones”. This discourse is followed by practices, that value 
customs, which originate in the ayllu-structure, and which are still are used: 
 
“I am proud that I belong to this ayllu. Some customs are gone, but the most 
important ones we still practice, especially the mutual aid. I don’t think this will 
disappear in our work and in the distribution of water. The traditional 
authorities are respected by all; the kuraka and the jilakata.” (Jacinto Ramos) 
 
The ayllus have had a tradition of solving problems inside the ayllu without 
interference of the Bolivian society as such: 
 
“By belonging to this ayllu we feel proud. We know that we are capable, we 
know each other well. At the meetings we think and say things because we want 
to resolve our problems. This is opposed to the persons who administer the 
institutions (the mayor, the municipal council), most of the time they have it all 
in the mouth, they talk, but they don not solve problems. They are not even 
prepared to treat people well, they just discriminate us.”  (Edgar Zuna) 
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In the Andean area, the production historically has centered round the ayllu as 
way of organizing daily life and production. The ayllu originally had land in 
different ecological zones, securing different products from the different climate 
zones. (Murra et.al. 1986). For example: The higher areas (the puna) in 3500-
4000 m’s were used for pasture for the animals (Lamas). On the high plains 
around 3500 m’s, people cultivated potatoes and quinoa (a grain indigenous to 
the Andean area). In the valley areas of 1500-3000 m’s, the members of the 
ayllu grew wheat, cotton, coca and corn. In the tropical lowlands the ayllu got 
fruit and other tropical products. Each ayllu consisted of a group of people 
connected by real or inhibited kinship. As the Spaniards penetrated the Andean 
area, the ayllus lost their land in the different ecological zones, and mostly were 
left with land in one zone only, often the higher areas, which were of no use to 
the Spaniards. This is also true for the ayllu Mankasaya, which is situated a little 
above a high plain, at the foothill of a mountain range.12
 
The social organization and way of organizing labor for production in the ayllu 
has been characterized by the principle of reciprocity. People have worked/work 
mutually in three different kinds of reciprocity practices:  
 
a) Ayni: mutual help between few persons, often related to each other by close 
family ties,  
b) Minka: mutual help by a larger number of people, i.e. constructing a house 
for a newly wed couple and,  
c) Faena: everybody in the comunidad/ayllu is needed for larger jobs, i.e. 
maintaining roads or cleaning irrigation systems. 
 
“In the habits of working the land some costums have been lost but we still use 
the minka and the ayni to help each other. Some of the ”evangelistas”13only 
work for themselves. They say that at the minka people drink a lot. But we do as 
we have done always because it is necessary that the family whom we work for 
offers chicha (alcoholic beverage) and food as a sign of appreciation.” (Edgar 
Zuna) 
 
The leadership in the ayllus is formally in the hands of the corregidor and the 
kuraka, but with the general assemblies, all members of the ayllu can voice their 
opinions. The assembly of the authorities (traditional leaders of the villages) 
normally call for general assemblies when important decisions have to be taken. 
 
“The most important authority in the comunidad is the corregidor, next is the 
curaca. But all the political and administative authorities (of the comunidad) 
always work together, all of them participate in the meetings.” (Donciano 
Espinoza) 
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Comunidad El Puente 
As most of agriculture in the high Andes, the fields of El Puente has to be 
irrigated for agricultural production. Since El Puente is situated near rivers that 
the mining companies use for dumping their waste, the water used for irrigation 
is often contaminated. This has produced serious health problems for the people 
in the area.  
 
Another problem for agriculture in the ex-hacienda areas is that the plots of land 
are becoming too small for the families to live on. As a consequence of the 
agrarian reform in 1953, buying and selling land was prohibited. This was built 
into the law to protect the peasants against the former hacienda-owners buying 
their land. But it also prevented the peasants from buying land and developing 
farms from which they could gather a proper income. The children all inherit 
land, and as a consequence of this, the plots of land today are very small. 
 
“The land I have is herited from my father. We were five brothers and sisters 
and between the five we have distributed the land equally, the women receive the 
same amount as the men”. (Simon López) 
 
It is not possible for a family to live from the land alone, and migration to 
Argentina or other parts of Bolivia is substantial. Almost all households have a 
family member working away, most often the father or the eldest son. This goes 
for people living in the ayllus as well. 
 
“I didn’t buy the land I have, I received it as heritage. What we can’t produce 
we buy from the feria in Belén.14I leave to work some months in Yacuiba and 
Santa Cruz. I don’t go to Argentina because it is not easy to obtain the relevant 
papers. Normally I work in the rice harvest and as workman’s helper”. ( 
Esteban Flores) 
 
Not only was trading land prohibited, furthermore the governments did nothing 
to pass reforms or laws that could encourage some form of economic and 
agricultural development in the rural areas. Having the incomes from the 
nationalized mining industry, the rural areas were of minor importance to the 
Bolivian governments. 
 
Even though the creation of a hacienda destroyed original forms of 
organizations (ayllus) in some part of the Andean area, ways of organizing the 
comunidad still show traits of former types of organizations. 
 
In comunidades in ex-hacienda areas many cargos of the ayllu have been 
installed again after the reorganization of the village following the agrarian 
reform in 1953, for example the kuraka:  
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“The type of kuraka that existed at the time of the hacienda disappeared when 
the agrarian reform came. Then people elected the “real” kuraka as a 
traditional authority. He had as a symbol: the ”cane of authority” (baston de 
manda). When the agrarian reform came I was comisario. A commission arrived 
and told me to tell all the laborers that the faenas and other working tasks for 
the patrón would be suspended.” (Leandro Salvador)  
 
Also the mutual work still exists (or has been reinstalled) in the ex-hacienda 
areas: 
 
“We must fulfill the obligations - the faenas and everything that the comunidad 
needs. I have my restaurant and I give a little more (money) than the rest. It’s 
okay with me, because in this way we contribute to the progress of the 
comunidad. I like how everything is organized. We have more order now than 
before.” (Gumercinda Romay) 
 
The obligation of fulfilling the duties of being an authority (autoridad: having a 
cargo) is taken very seriously by the members of the comunidad. Even though 
long hours are spent in meetings, forcing the authorities to neglect their work 
with their fields and animals, it is seen as very important serving as an authority: 
 
I like being an authority, even though I know that being an authority I neglect 
my own things, my family. But I like it. I have done three duties: representative 
of the women, comisario and now I’m principal. This year I’m doing double. 
The comisario of my section left after half a year and the council told me that I 
couldn’t leave my area without a comisario. To solve this problem I had to fulfill 
this duty as well.” (Máxima Colque)  
 
As we have seen, the members of the ayllu show great pride in belonging to an 
ayllu. The people of the ex-hacienda areas show pride in living in the rural area 
and being campesinos: 
 
“As I see it, the people in the city live more comfortable compared with us, but I 
wouldn’t like to be a city person because living in the rural area we can always 
sow something, if there is a surplus we can sell it and if not, at least we have 
something to eat. In the city, on the other hand, everything has to do with 
money. The people from the city say that the peasants don’t know much, they 
don’t respect us. But this doesn’t worry me, I am proud of being a peasant and I 
don’t think that we should feel any shame.” (Alejandro Flores) 
 
 
Participación Popular Seen From “Below” 
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Since the rural areas have been marginalised for years by government and 
administrative authorities, the people living in the rural areas have themselves 
spent money and labor-power every time things needed to be done: 
 
“The comunidad asked to have a project of electrification but until now the 
municipality has not met its obligations. For us nothing has changed with 
Participación Popular, we have always ourselves dealt with things. Our fathers 
and grandfathers gave contributions and participated in faenas. We still do the 
same if we want something done in the comunidad.” 
(Jacinto Ramos) 
 
Others see some advantages in the reform. Prior to Participación Popular the 
funds of the state seldom reached the level of the comunidades. The only 
support people in the rural areas could expect, was some project of a NGO or an 
international development agency. 
 
“The Participación Popular is good. Before this law there were no help for our 
comunidad if we wanted something done. We had to go as far as Potosí to ask 
for help, but the authorities there didn’t receive us, we always had to wait for an 
answer and sometimes they couldn’t meet with us at all. But with this 
Participación Popular we can go directly to the municipality, and as far as I see 
it, they receive us well there.” (Braulio Chuca) 
 
Seen from the local level, the major problem is poor administration of the 
municipalities from local authorities (mayor, members of municipal council). A 
number of municipalities have spent the first money they have received from the 
Participación Popular on “obras” - constructions in the urban centers, i.e. 
rebuilding the mayors office, construction or restoration of plazas or parks etc. 
This is slowly changing, but seen from the rural areas of the municipalities, 
things could change a little faster: 
 
“If those who administer this law on popular participation did it with 
responsibility it would be better. It is a good law, we have received something 
with these funds, it’s better than nothing... 
The law can work and have a future if these funds could arrive directly to the 
campesino because in our comunidad we have many needs. For example the 
water, the irrigation systems and the canals need contributions. If the law 
changes when the government changes, it would mean a lot of damage for us. 
(Alejandro Flores) 
 
As noted above, the political ”system” in Bolivia has been very paternalistic. 
The law Participación Popular is designed to change this political culture. But as 
seen, the campesinos do not have faith in the government authorities’ will to 
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change things. Often they say that they are nothing more than tools or “steps” in 
the ladder of the careers of the politicians: 
 
“I think that this and the other laws15 do not help much in the rural areas. We 
are just “steps” to make the politicians progress. Here we go on doing things as 
we always have done with our own hands, we have received very little from the 
government.” (Simon Lopez)    
 
Even though this rather pessimistic opinion is often voiced, others believe, that 
in time the law will change things for the better: 
 
“I don’t know what will happen in the future with the law on popular 
participation. The radio says this and that, but in the end I think that this law 
will help some. We the campesinos need a better life, that our land gets better 
and we need to be able to look after our families in a good way. I think that the 
law expresses this too, and the authorities (mayor, government) should fulfill 
this and not cheat the comunidades.” (Juan Llanos)  
 
Indigenous Authority vs. State Policy.  
The indigenous people of Bolivia, who live in the rural areas have not been used 
to obtaining any advantages from state policies. During history, the rural areas 
have witnessed several land reform, which all have reduced the areas available 
to the indigenous population. Also the people of the rural areas have been used 
to a position of opposition and protest against the central government (Jeppesen 
2001). 
 
As a result of the marginalization by the central government, and the lack of 
municipal administration until the approval of the reform of popular 
participation, the social and economic organization of the rural indigenous 
villages have revolved around indigenous forms of organization, either in the 
form of the ayllu, or in the transformed form of village councils with traits of 
ayllu organization in the villages of the former hacienda areas. In the course of 
time different central powers: the Spaniards, the oligarchy and the governments 
introduced laws, which altered first and foremost rights to land. But the social 
organization was left unaltered by central governments, since the indigenous 
rural population was regarded as of no interest to central governments, whose 
income was secured by export of natural resources (silver under the Spaniards, 
agricultural products, tin and other minerals in the independent republic and tin 
and other minerals under the governments after the revolution). The fall of the 
tin prices in 1985 changed this, and the Bolivian State looked for a way to 
secure new income. Seen in this light, the reform of popular participation can be 
seen as one tool of incorporating the indigenous rural population in the state and 
making them willing to pay taxes, which they have not done until now. Critiques 
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have been voiced in Bolivia, though, that this political incorporation does not 
open specific economic opportunities for the rural indigenous population 
(Jeppesen 2001). Until economic opportunities are introduced, the popular 
participation might end as just another measure from the centralised state 
authorities, which has no implication for the local rural population other than a 
continuation of their difficulties. The support for the participation will therefore 
maybe be of limited size, since the exclusion of the rural population regarding 
economic possibilities has not changed. The indigenous authorities will then still 
be the most important power at village level, and the new institutions like the 
OTB's will have limited importance.  On the other hand people might find use in 
representing their villages in the municipal governments, if they can find ways 
to be elected outside the realm of the political parties. What is needed is to open 
a space outside traditional power structures, represented by the political parties, 
and find new ways to evolve into the (new) power structures. 
 
Conclusion 
The law on popular participation is designed as a tool for change in the Bolivian 
society. It is a measure of acknowledging the difficult situation of the rural 
indigenous population in the Andes as well as the plains and forests of Eastern 
Bolivia. It is also a part of the democratization process, which is taking place in 
most Latin American countries today. 
 
Transforming the Bolivian State from a party-ruled monolith representing only a 
small segment of Bolivian society into a democratic state in line with the “good 
governance” philosophy of the donor organizations as well as representing the 
actual Bolivian population, which consists of a large percentage of indigenous 
people is not an easy task. One can discuss whether the democratization in the 
western definition of the notion is possible in a country like Bolivia (Andersson 
1998). But the reform could be seen as a first step for the indigenous population 
in gaining citizenship and thereby exerting influence on (local) politics with 
possibilities of achieving goals that would improve every-day life for the rural 
indigenous population. In this manner, the concerns of the rural population have 
a chance of being acknowledged through municipal democracy and decisions, 
which ideally originate from ”below” in a democratic process. 
 
As it is designed, the law will not attempt to incorporate the rural indigenous 
population by altering their status in Bolivian society as was the case in the 
attempt from 1952 and onwards in changing the rural population into 
“campesinos”, seen as a homogenous entity and not taking into consideration the 
different modes of organization in the rural areas.16
 
 15
Today’s emphasis on the diversity of the Bolivian society as expressed in the 
constitution17 can open “spaces” (political and physical) for the rural indigenous 
population of Bolivia. 
 
This working paper has given voice to some of the people for whom the 
Participación Popular was intended. As we can see, the people of the highland 
rural areas of Bolivia – whether living in ayllus or in ex-hacienda areas – do not 
expect a lot from the central government. Elsewhere I have discussed the 
“clash” between the local elite and political parties with the indigenous peoples’ 
organizations 18, which in many respects seem to represent two elements, which 
will be difficult to unite. But if corruption and discrimination can be reduced, 
the municipal governments might overcome old practices of ruling, and create 
new spaces where different groups of Bolivian society can meet. Some do see 
advantages, as we have seen in the quotations. The question is, however, 
whether the indigenous population and their organizations are considered as 
equal partners by the government. One could suspect, that Bolivia’s dependency 
on foreign aid has made the opinion of the donors count most in this question. 
Among donors’ democratization, human and indigenous rights are high on the 
agenda.  
 
  
Notes 
                                                          
1 In the colonial period the criollos were those persons born in the colony by Spanish parents. 
They did not possess the same rights as Spaniards born in Spain. For example criollos 
couldn’t occupy official posts, this was reserved for Spaniards born in Spain. Later the term 
’criollo’ means descendant of the Spaniards. 
2 The state owns major industries and mines. Also the state is centralistic and forming a huge 
apparatus of bureaucracy. 
3 The leaders of the ayllus have different names in the different parts of Bolivia. But the 
structure of leadership is more or less the same. 
4 This was called ‘reducciones’ and was introduced by the Viceking Toledo in the 1570's. 
5 In the Spanish era, the corregidores were ‘mayors’ of smaller administrative areas (canton), 
referring to the closest Spanish administrator. The corregidor was mostly from ‘outside’ the 
rural area, often an urban mestizo with some education. After the revolution of 1952, the 
corregidor is a political nominated authority, taken from within the comunidades. Although, 
the cargo is often political, it is still regarded as a cargo, which all male members of the 
comunidad should hold for a year. 
6 In fact, there is some dispute as to who were the tax collectors after 1952. In some 
comunidades it was the kuraka and in others the corregidor. The rural tax was abandoned in 
the mid-1980s. 
7 On “nation-building processes see Gellner, 1983 and Anderson 1991. 
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8 One of the expressed goals of the MNR in the revolutionary periods was to create a more 
equal Bolivian society. This was partly due to the fact, that MNR needed the peasant militsias 
to fight the oligarchy. To motivate the peasants, a program for a “new” Bolivia was created. 
Once in power, the MNR abandoned many of its former goals. 
 
9 Except in the agro-industrial areas of the Santa Cruz department. 
 
10 After the independence, the kurakas again were elected among the inhabitants of the 
community, and the cargo transformed to be annual. 
 
11 This is for example the situation in the community of El Puente in the Coma municipality, 
where I did my fieldwork. 
12 In the southern part of the municipality there is another ayllu named Mankasaya. 
Historically the two were part of one ayllu (different ecological zones), but the division of the 
area in between into hacienda lands, has separated the two. 
13 In the rural areas the evangelian church has spread to many villages, and in some up to 50% 
of the people now belong to the evangelian church. Among other things this means that they 
do not drink alcohol when doing common work or celebrating. 
14 Town nearby which has a market every weekend. 
 
15 I.e. INRA (agricultural reform) and the education reform.  
 
16 The organizing practices are different in different parts of Bolivia. In the Andean area, the 
ayllus and ex-hacienda areas predominates. In Eastern Bolivia small groups of hunters and 
gathers live in the forests along with peasants and big farms, and in the plains other ways of 
organising production exists, i.e. large cattle farms in the Chaco. 
 
17 In 1994 the constitution was altered, and it was stressed that Bolivia is a multiethnic and 
pluricultural state. 
 
18 Andersson, 1999 & 2000. 
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